SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines tradeoffs among land-based offensive missiles, their silos or shelters, and their exoatmospherlc and/or endoatmospherlc defensive missiles.
These tradeoffs are of Importance In two principal contexts. First, combinations of forces which yield a specified number of warheads 1 delivered
In a second strike, after having absorbed a first strike, are of Interest. Second, combinations of forces which allow a first strike while denying a successful retaliation are of Interest.
(From a deterrence point of view these combinations should be avoided, for they may encourage a first strike.) The paper explores a number of Important sensitivities, particularly among defensive missile options. The paper does not treat U.S. and Soviet strategic bomber and submarine forces.
If either U.S. or Soviet land-based ■ missiles were vulnerable to the bomber-or submarine-delivered ^e term "warheads" is used throughout this paper; the term "re-entry vehicles" (or "RVs") can be substituted if the reader prefers to think in these terms.
1
weapons of the other side, the results of this paper would be less meaningful and an analysis of broader scope would be required.
The model and the effectiveness and cost parameters are drawn from a study published by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Ref-
erence [1] ). That study treats the symmetric case, several additional aspects of which are analyzed here. That study does not treat the asymmetric case explored in the present paper.
B. MODEL
Definitions and Values of Effectiveness Inputs
Definitions are given below. Outcomes S = missiles surviving first strike W = warheads delivered in second strike ,
Attrition Equations
The model basically has three levels, as defenses are
Introduced.
The equations are given below, followed by interpretations in subsequent pages. 
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Interpretation of Attrition Equations
Interpretation of the attrition equations of the model is U'M' shelter is attacked by ~--warheads.
Its probability of LJ survival is (l-p') . The expected number of survivors is relatively straightforward.
In the first level, each silo or
. The number of warheads delivered in the second strike is yS. This sequence assumes that attacking warheads are distributed identically over all of the silos or shelters, which maximizes the destruction by the warheads. A crucial assumption is that warheads are distributed over H rather than M; position location uncertainty (PLU) is preserved.
In the second level, each silo or shelter which holds missiles is defended by y endoatmospheric interceptors. T y, I M I warheads directed at each such silo or shelter number H ' they are attacked by y interceptors, identically distributed over these warheads. The probability of survival of each 'y'M'
P-
y / H warhead is (1-r) , termed the leakage factor L of the n endoatmospheric defense. The probability of a missile surviving leakage and kill is (l-p'L ) raised to the number of attacking y'M' n warheads In the third level, the first defense is by the exoatmospheric interceptors. Defending kill vehicles in number x^ attack warheads directed at missiles in number y'M'(^), H identically distributed over these warheads.
The probability XX/y'M'(|) of survival of each warhead is (1-q) , termed the leakage factor L x of the exoatmospheric defense. By a logic identical to that of the second level discussed above, the probability of a missile surviving exoatmospheric and endo- 
Costs
Costs are taken from the Los Alamos study. They are as follows:
Exoatmospheric Interceptors (X) 7,000
Endoatmospheric Interceptors (N) 5,000
Silos (H) 0
To illustrate how these costs match force structures, the following information is of interest: Missiles and exoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to share many common features and thus have common production learning curve effects. Endoatmospheric interceptors are assumed to have separate production learning curve effects.
The present paper treats silos almost exclusively. Several results are given for shelters, but the costs displayed are almost always for silos.
As can be seen from the table above, shelters are much less expensive beyond 2,000.
The probability of kill of a warhead against a silo or a shelter is assumed to be .8. Presumably, silos would be harder than shelters and thus the probability of kill against a missile in a silo should be less than against a shelter. The present paper should not be considered to distinguish between silos and shelters; more analysis is necessary.
C. SYMMETRIC ANALYSIS
Previous Results, With Some Modifications
The Los Alamos study presents symmetric force structures which are stated to be minimum-cost inventories needed on both sides to achieve the specified deterrence criterion of 1,000
warheads delivered on the second strike. Several modifications to and comments about the above results are of interest:
(1) Case 2 assumes that half of the 230 endos protect themselves 3 giving an effective number of 115 endos protecting missiles. Raising the effective number of endos from 115 to 230 by eliminating the requirement for this self-protection would raise warheads delivered from 1,008 to 1,124. If this were assumed costless, W/C would be 42.6. Alternatively, if 230 more endos were provided for self-defense, for a total of 460 endos, the total cost would be $27.2 Billion and W/C would be 41.3. Both modifications would significantly raise W/C.
(2) Cases 3 and 4 assume that endos defend all silos. But if endos were provided for missiles only, on the theory that exos would be fired before endos and thus would need no defense, costs would decrease by $.7 Billion and $1.1 Billion, respectively. The values of W/C would increase from 32.4 to 33-1 and from 31.8 to 32.9, respectively. decreases (see the upper ends of the curves for 1,000 silos and 2,000 silos.) Figure 1 shows that warheads delivered as a function of cost is most favorable with fewer silos and many endos.
However, the upper limit on number of endo shots per defended silo is a technologically uncertain parameter. Recall that silos and shelters are essentially treated interchangeably here. Costs shown are for silos; thus the term silos is used.
.
Silos and Exoatmospheric Interceptors In all of these cases, when there is not exo impact-point prediction, results are seriously affected.
Impact-point prediction will be discussed in more detail below.
4.
Exo Impact-Point Prediction Sensitivity Analyses Table 1 For the small number of exos, namely 100, the effect of no showing how adding silos yields warheads delivered In the second strike when there are 100 exos with no Impact-point prediction.
Recall, however, that If 200 rather than 100 exos were Included there would be at most 912 warheads delivered In the second strike when f=.6 and 400 when f=1.0 because of the first striker's exos. Independent of the number of silos. Tables 1   and 2 showing the effects of mixes of silos and exos. In this case with no endos. With Impact-point prediction, for both f=.6 and f=1.0, warheads delivered decrease as exos Increase for all cases except f=.6 and 500 silos. With no Impact-point prediction, f=1.0, and 1,000 or 2,000 silos, note that warheads delivered Increase between 100 and 200 exos and decrease between 200 and 300 exos. Current inventories of missiles and warheads, however, are larger than those analyzed in the symmetric case. And a deceptive basing posture on one side but not the other may lead to different first and second strike characteristics than observed in the symmetric analysis.
The asymmetric analysis which follows deals with a presumptive Soviet force of 1,300 missiles with an average of 5 warheads per missile. A U.S. force is to be designed which survives a first strike by this Soviet force and retaliates with roughly 1,000 warheads. Each U.S. missile is assumed to have 10 warheads.
1.
200 Missiles in 2,000 Silos
The first U.S. force explored has 200 missiles in 2,000 silos. Figure 3 shows U.S. warheads delivered as a function of cost for three cases:
(1) no U.S. exos, and endos varied from 0 to 2,000; (2) 50 U.S. exos with impact-point prediction, and endos varied from 0 to 2,000; (3) 50 U.S. exos with no impact-point prediction, and endos varied from 0 to 2,000. The options with 3,000 silos cost more than those with 2,000 silos.
The dashed lines display Soviet warheads delivered in the second strike after a 200-missile attack and,after a 400-missile attack.
As in Figure 3 From a modeling point of view, more analysis is needed of the endo defense doctrine, with particular emphasis on allocations and on assessments with integers.
3.
Overall Effects of Exo Impact-Point Prediction Figure 5 shows the overall characteristics of exo defense with and without impact-point prediction.
There are 2,000 silos.
The solid curves represent impact-point prediction. The dashed curves represent no impact-point prediction.
The top two curves for 100 exos show that U.S. warheads delivered rise quickly as endos are added to 100 exos. For 200 U.S. missiles, 2,000 is the upper limit and is attained with 200 endos. For 400 U.S. missiles, 4,000 is the upper limit and is approached more gradually. The same cross-over behavior as discussed previously, which could be eliminated by changing defense doctrine, is present. Overall, Figure 5 shows that, without Impact-point prediction, for all cases the U.S. must have about 800 endos with 2,000 silos before the goal of 1,000 warheads delivered on the second strike is achieved. This result is also true, however, without any exos. Thus, from a qualitative point of view, exos add little effectiveness if they do not have impact-point prediction.
. Two-Sided Analysis
The final analysis addresses the issue of identifying equal-size endo deployments which would allow both sides to have approximately the same second-strike capability, while allowing the Soviets to retain 1,300 missiles in 1,300 silos and U.S. adoption of a multiple-aimpoint deployment. endos are defending each missile, he can attack a subset of the missiles with sufficient warheads to exhaust the defense. Leakage and exhaustion attacks are explored in a recent study by Raymond E. Starsman (Reference [4] ). The analysis of the present paper could be extended to compute results for both attack allocations and choose the better allocation.
Leakage attacks can be directed at a subset of the silos, and exo and endo defenses can cover a subset of the attacked silos (the latter is discussed in connection with Figure 4 above) A more complete analysis would take such options into account.
Independent of the allocations of both sides, the Los Alamos attrition model applied in this paper could be Improved by treating distributions of warheads surviving exo and endo defenses and missiles surviving attacks by those warheads.
F. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In both the symmetric and asymmetric analyses of this paper, combinations of missiles, silos and endos achieve 1,000 warheads delivered at lower cost than do combinations which include exos. Furthermore, if exos do not have impact-point prediction they are not cost-effective; and, exos may be considered to be destabilizing if they protect population from a second strike. However, the paper assumes that PLU is achievable. If this assumption is rejected or significantly weakened, then the number of warheads per silo may be greater than a reasonable number of defending endos per silo. In this case it is necessary to consider use of exos.
